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Introduction
In Guerrilla Metaphysics (2005), the text which most extensively unpacks the
theory of vicarious causation, Graham Harman very closely associates the
underlying causal mechanics of his metaphysical argument with the topics of
media and communication. A good deal of the book’s intellectual labor is
devoted to locating the “medium” whereby the Harmanian version of an object—
a discrete unit of being whose full measure of existence is withdrawn from the
relational domain of reality, subsisting in the ontological “vacuum” of an
undisclosed, pre-worldly womb— is able to interact with and affect other
objects.1 As the search for this medium is pursued throughout the text, the
transfer of causal force from one object to another is explicitly characterized as
“communication.” This occurs in a passage that discusses the preoccupation of
medieval Islamic and early-modern European thinkers with the nature and preconditional bases of causal interaction:
The problem of causation by way of deputies rather than through
substances themselves already dominated one of the great eras of
systematic philosophy, the seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries in Europe. At an earlier time it had also played a role in
Islamic theology. In Europe, what really links the so-called
Rationalists and Empiricists is their shared puzzlement over the
problem of communication, which initially seems so hopeless
between the separate zones of the world. In the former group, God
is invoked to serve as the link between disparate real substances; in
the latter, the human mind is the medium that links together
disparate qualities in the hypothesis of an underlying substance. In
both cases, the problem is how disparate regions of the world
manage to fuse together.2
Shortly after associating causal fusion with “the problem of
communication,” Harman reveals the manner in which the puzzlements induced
by mediated impact inform his unique variety of Speculative Realist metaphysics.
As the syncretic heir to both the Rationalist and Empiricist branches of European
thought, “the Kantian settlement” of the first Critique preserves a concern with
the question of communication; but, Harman argues, it does so in a drastically
curtailed and circumscribed manner, reducing the manifold gaps that stretch
between objects of every conceivable size, shape and ontological variety into the

1

Graham Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things.
(Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2005), 91.
2
Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 92.
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single gap separating the human subject from “whatever lies beyond.”3 In
Harman’s view, this single, solitary gap is still the dominant preoccupation of
contemporary, post-Kantian philosophy, and therefore continues to serve as the
topical focal point for philosophical discourses about communication. As such, it
is the philosophical motif to which Harman is most centrally opposed. Or, put
more accurately, it is what he wishes to extrapolate into a more-than-human
feature of all ontology, so that finite acts of communication across gaps of every
conceivable sort can be granted their due as inherent, structural features of
existence. In his pursuit of this larger agenda, Harman reintroduces the notion of
“occasional cause” into his metaphysical system, translating a tweaked version of
its conceptual underpinnings into his theory of vicarious causation.4
Due to its conflation of mediation and communication with causation
itself, Harman’s philosophical project has inspired explorations of its direct
relevance to the fields of media and communication studies. Harman has
delivered a number of lectures comparing Marshall McLuhan’s four laws of
media to Martin Heidegger’s fourfold theory of reality-as-a-whole.5 And in Unit
Operation: An Approach to Videogame Criticism (2006), Ian Bogost cites
Harman’s notion of an object as an analogue to his ontologically-inflected
definition of a computational unit.6 In his more recent Alien Phenomenology, or
What It’s Like to Be a Thing (2012), Bogost also deploys the metaphorical
elements involved in Harman’s model of vicarious causation towards an expanded
phenomenological method, called “metaphorism,” which attempts to access the
“experiences” of nonhuman objects, including technological artifacts such as the
digital SLR cameras produced by Sigma.7
As of yet, however, such efforts have not produced a detailed, nuts-andbolts attempt to put the technical dimensions of Harman’s causal theory to work
in the analysis of a multi-mediated cultural product. This is the undertaking that
3

Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 92.
Harman, Guerilla Meatphysics, 92-93.
5
For example: Graham Harman, “The Medium of Being Is Itself a Being: Heidegger and
McLuhan.” (University of Twente, Enschede, Netherlands, January 7, 2008); and
“Greenberg, Heidegger, McLuhan and the Arts.” (Pacific Northwest College of Craft,
Portland, OR, January 22, 2013).
6
Bogost, Unit Operations: An Approach to Videogame Criticism. (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2006) 5.
7
Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, Or What It’s Like to be a Thing. (Minneapolis:
University of Minneapolis Press, 2012). For Bogost’s discussion of the panexperientialist elements in his approach, including his debt to Alfred North Whitehead
in this area, see pages 10-11. The discussion of “Metaphorism,” including the analysis
of a digital camera’s experience of the world, occurs in a chapter that goes by that
name, on pages 61-84.

4
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is pursued in this paper, albeit with a number of case-sensitive adjustments at the
level of methodology and critical orientation. In what follows, I focus upon a
specific group of closely related, mass-mediated products and texts, with an eye
trained closely on the ways in which their causal relationships to each other can
be modeled according the theory of vicarious causation.
The texts to be analyzed in this way are members of the multi-modal
media grouping that is popularly known as the Game of Thrones (or GoT)
franchise. Altogether, this grouping includes a best-selling series of novels by
George R.R. Martin; an extremely successful television series that is currently
being produced and aired by HBO; a video game made for PlayStation 3 and
Xbox by the ATLUS corporation; a strategic board game merchandised by
Fantasy Flight Games; and a large number of other cross-marketed products,
including a fairly typical smattering of toys, comic books, tee-shirts, and mugs.
Although some of the philosophical insights to be derived from this particular
nexus of products could be extracted from other, similar franchises (such as Star
Wars, Lord of the Rings, or Doctor Who), there are a number of ways in which
this particular textual and commercial cluster recommends itself to the type of
analysis that is carried out here. Most particularly, this includes a salient
relationship of the franchise’s core narrative elements to actual historical events—
specifically: to the fifteenth-century English dynastic conflicts known as the Wars
of the Roses. As we will see, this relationship can be interestingly modeled in
vicariously causal terms.
Throughout subsequent discussion, particular focus is given to the books
of the series and the first three seasons of the television show, the latter of which
comprise adaptations of the former.8 At points throughout, the video and board
games are subjected to somewhat less detailed, more intermittent scrutiny, while
collector’s items such as action figures and coffee cups are more-or-less omitted
from the discussion.
At the level of metaphysical analysis, subsequent argument treats various
modes and adaptations of the Game of Thrones product nexus as specimens of
what are called objects in Harman’s Object Oriented Philosophy. That is: they are
treated as a discrete entities, possessed of a measure of ontological independence
from the relational contexts in which they are enmeshed and from the parts of
which they are made.9 Treated as such, these modes and adaptations are analyzed
8

The entire television series is simply titled “Game of Thrones,” while the first and
second books are entitled A Game of Thrones and A Clash of Kings, respectively.
9
This metaphysical characterization of objects is spread throughout all of Harman’s
current oeuvre, but for a pivotally important inaugural text, see Graham Harman, Tool
Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Chicago: Open Court, 2005). For a
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according to the theory of vicarious causation, particularly with regard to this
theory’s technical portrayal of qualitative interaction between objects. In terms of
scope, this analysis includes the causal relationships of these modes and
adaptations to each other, as well as their relationship to the historical events by
which they are partly inspired.
With all of that said, this is a convenient point at which to clarify the
overall relationship of the type of media analysis that is engaged in here to
Harman’s object-oriented philosophy (OOP), and to Object Oriented Ontology
(OOO) as a whole. The first thing that should be pointed out, in this regard, is
that these terms are not synonyms. There is in fact more than one type of Object
Oriented Ontology, of which Harman’s version is only one specimen.10
Throughout this paper, I focus only on OOP, and do not delve into the rest of
OOO. The former’s relationship to the current work is that of a salient influence
to an influenced party. As whole, this paper functions as a sort of experimental
test-run for the ways in which certain Harmanian ideas can be applied to the study
of multi-mediated texts, with Game of Thrones serving as something of a guinea
pig.
As will become clear below, however, OOP’s impact on this experiment is
tempered by an important adjustments at the level of technical detail. This
concerns Harman’s general reluctance to allow any sort of positive
characterization of an object’s essential qualities, or any ontic parsing of essential
and inessential traits. Although it is motivated by an understandable, politicallysensitive caution about the question of essence, this reluctance also serves to
hamper the extent to which the theory of vicarious causation can be applied to
empirical content as an analytical tool.11 Below, I suggest a compromise
approach, one that preserves the ultimate unknowability of essence while
allowing for a greater degree of positive speculation concerning the ways in
which relational or sensual qualities might be cautiously and tentatively tied to the
real or even essential qualities of an object. In addition to this adjustment, I also
propose a new subcategory of the metaphysical mechanism that lies at the heart of
vicarious causation, which Harman calls “allure.”12 Called “mediational allure,”
this new category refers to what happens when one object affects the manner in
compressed, summary rendering of the ideas contained in several of his early texts, see
Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (Washington: Zero Books, 2011).
10
At the level of systematic philosophical differences, the most significant divergence is
between Harman and Levi Bryant, whose version of OOO denies that objects withdraw
into a vacuum. See Levi Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor: Open
Humanities Press, 2011) 71.
11
For Harman’s take on the politics of essence, see: Harman, Tool Being, 172-173.
12
See Guerilla Metaphysics, 141-144, and elsewhere throughout the book.

communication+1 Vol. 2 [2013], Iss. 1, Article 2
4

Pedinotti / Game of Objects

which a second object has a causal encounter with a third. Involving three objects
altogether, this new variety of allure is able to include more objects than would
seem to be allowed under Harman’s “Binary Contact Principle,” while still
complying with its overall rule regarding the nature of causal impact.13
Its technical import aside, this paper also contains several findings with
broad implications for the metaphysical modeling of media and mediational
processes. Extracted from the empirical case study, these include several ways of
describing impact in linear causal networks, including descriptions of the ways in
which mediated formal causation can bypass chronological linearity. Also
included are a few suggestions about the ways in which a transition from
narratively predetermined to gamically open-ended textual outcomes might have
metaphysical significance.
Before getting to any of that, however, the theory of vicarious causation
will need to be briefly explained. For this reason, the bulk of the next section is
devoted to a compressed summary of the theory’s main processes and
components. Once this explanation is carried out, we will turn to our analysis of
Game of Thrones and begin to unpack its theoretical implications.
Vicarious Causation
The term, “vicarious causation,” refers to the lack of full presence that, in
Harman’s model of the world, attends any encounter between beings. Harman
holds that when two objects come into contact, neither plumbs the ontological
depths of the other. On the contrary, they only ever touch via a metonymic
process, through which one aspect or quality of a thing fills in for its full reality,
thereby producing a relational result.14 One of Harman’s favorite examples for
illustrating this causal model—one that is also used by earlier, occasionalist
thinkers— is the burning of cotton by fire.15 When this occurs, the fire does not
relate to every sensual quality comprising the being of the cotton, such as its
color, scent, or smell. Nor does it have a direct encounter with the ontological
factor that holds the fire together as a being (the “real object”), or to any of the
fire’s qualities-unto-itself (its “real qualities”). What the fire touches in the cotton
is only the sensual, relatable qualities of the thing that are relevant to it.16
13

Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Melbourne:
re.press, 2009)
14
Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 201; 206.
15
Instances of this example are spread throughout all of his books.
16
“[F]ire burns cotton and rock shatters window. And yet these objects do not fully
touch one another, since both harbor additional secrets inaccessible to the other, as
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Although the resultant encounter may transform or even destroy other sensual
qualities in the thing, the actual point of contact is between the flammability of
the cotton and the burning quality of the flame.
For Harman, this is the nature of all relation: things only ever make
contact with other things as reductions, caricatures, or qualitative profiles of
themselves.17 The basis for this metaphysical claim derives from the fundamental
argument of Harman’s work—namely: that the discrete entities of the world
cannot be reduced to their relations to other things, but contain a withdrawn, nonrelational nugget at the core of their being. In the absence of such an ontological
factor, Harman argues, change would be impossible, and reality would be reduced
to an endless game of hot potato in which relations are perpetually passed around
without ever arriving at any sort of substantial anchor.18 Because every object that
exists exceeds its relations of the moment, its encounters with other things are
never fully able to compass its being. All interaction is therefore fundamentally
mediated in nature, involving the limited participation of relational proxies. As
we have seen, a causal location or event is itself defined as a medium:
A medium is any space in which two objects interact, whether the
human mind be one of these objects or not. Human sense
experience is only one particular zone or medium of the world, and
possibly not even the most interesting one. The medium between
objects is the glue that makes possible the entire carpentry of
things—without it, the world would remain a set of
noncommunicating crystalline spheres sleeping away in private
vacuums. If substances cannot communicate directly, then there
still must be some way in which they allow their traits to break free
and act as couriers and emissaries, entering the world of relations
as if into an illegal dance club.19
The chapters of Guerrilla Metaphysics comprise a cumulative search for the
nature of this medium, throughout which the gradual accumulation of concepts
serves as a set of stepping-stones to the answer. Although the resultant sense of
mystery lends itself to an interesting reading experience, I will here take a reverse
when the faint aroma of the cotton and the foreboding sparkle of the fire remain deaf to
one another’s songs.” (Harman, Tool Being, 170.)
17
This idea is initially developed throughout the first part of Tool Being, while its causal
consequences are the focus of all of Guerilla Metaphysics.
18
Arguments for this idea are also spread throughout Harman’s body-of-work,
particularly occupying the first and third parts of Tool Being. For a compressed
rendition of the arguments, see Guerilla Metaphysics, Chapter 6, “Objects,” 73-87.
19
Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 92.

communication+1 Vol. 2 [2013], Iss. 1, Article 2
6

Pedinotti / Game of Objects

approach to summarizing the outcome, giving the answer first, and then
unpacking its explanatory components—a method that seems more fitted to a
compressed explanation.
In short, the answer is: the medium of relation for two objects is another
object, inside of which they meet.20 This is accompanied by an important
stipulation, which is that, when two relating objects come together inside a
medium, they produce a new object, which is the relation itself. This proviso
accords with an oft-repeated statement that occurs in Harman’s work: “Every
relation is also an object.”21 Thus, even phenomena of a highly processual sort—
such as avalanches, volcanic eruptions, and eclipses—all count as objects in an
object-oriented framework. 22 This is true all the way down the scale of spatial
size, with autonomous objects folded into autonomous objects from galaxies to
solar systems to atoms and smaller particles, each part of a larger thing that
amounts to a separate being in its own right. The inclusive nature of this claim
also applies to the entire span of existing time: every causal event is an object,
with events of various size folded into each other across differently-sized spans of
time. For this reason, Harman argues that efficient causation is really only a
special case of formal causation. All objects are forms, and every efficient act is
contained by them, comprising one of their formally configured parts.23
The subcomponents and sub-processes comprising vicarious causation are
fairly complex, involving distinct structural domains of existence. On the
relational plane of reality, Harman argues that objects appear to each other as
“sensual” manifestations.24 A sensual being is inherently relational, only
appearing when an object encounters another object. For example: when a
graduate student has an office meeting with an adviser, the adviser does not
encounter the entirety of the student, but a relational stand-in, made up from a
combination of the student’s sensual qualities. As a sensual object, the student
himself is encountered via an abbreviated, singular “note” that compresses the
20

Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 189; 193.
See, for instance: Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 85: “But if every object can also be
considered as a set of relations, it is equally true that any relation must count as a
substance. When two objects enter into genuine relation, even if they do not fuse
together, they generate a reality that has all the features that we require of an object.”
22
Again: Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 85.
23
“…it should be clear that objects encounter their neighbors as unified forms, not just as
tiny pixels of tiny uncuttable matter… The story of the world is a tale of interacting
forms or objects of all possible sizes at all possible levels, not of pampered scintillae of
underlying material.” (Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 170)
24
Harman, Prince of Networks, 214-221; The Quadruple Object, Chapter 2, “Sensual
Objects,” 20-34.

21
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entire array of his relational being into a recognizable façade.25 In this way, the
sensual object serves as a realist version of Husserl’s intentional object, a being
which can be seen from a variety of angles yet still holds together as the same
being despite the differing perspectives from which it is seen.26 When this
happens, sensual qualities never appear as pure qualitative data, but always as
qualities of the sensual object to which they are tied. If the student is red-headed,
for example, then the redness of his hair is never simply redness-as-such, but the
red of that particular student’s hair. This is true despite the fact that the is related
to a part of the student that itself comprises an object—the student’s head, or the
hair itself, conceived as an object—because the form of the larger object that is
the student unifies and inflects its qualities.
The same is true all of the student’s recognizable traits. His vocal
inflections, his eye color and quirks of personality: each derives its qualitative
force from one of the student’s subcomponents, and this subcomponent itself
comprises an object incorporated into the student. Despite their plurality and
distinctness from each other, the qualities of these components are combined in
the intentional “note” that is the student’s sensual profile. A strange type of
unity-within-plurality therefore prevails within the sensual object. Harman holds
that each of its qualities is the object encountered in relational acts. Capable of
manifesting as any of these qualities, the sensual object is always less than the
sum of its known features, or something that manifests entirely through each of
them.27 In this way, sensual objects behave like information compressing
machines, siphoning qualities from the smaller parts of which they are made and
combining them into the single, recognizable note that is that object.28 In
Husserlian terms, the tension produced by this formal unity is called the eidos.29
In the majority of ontological circumstances, eidetic unity functions as a
background factor informing interactions between objects. Things simply coexist
25

Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 185.
This characterization of intentional objects is spread throughout Husserl’s Logical
Investigations, Volumes I and II. Three of the investigations that are most relevant to
object-oriented philosophy are Investigation II: The Ideal Unity of the Species and
Modern Theories of Abstraction, in Edmund Husserl Logical Investigations: Volume 1
(New York: Routledge, 2001) 235-313; Investigation III: On the Theory of Wholes
and Parts and Investigation V: On Intentional Experiences and their ‘Contents,’ both
in Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations: Volume 2 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 145 and 77-334, respectively.
27
Harman, Prince of Networks, 216. This point actually involves a departure from
Husserl, who argued that intentional objects are more than the sum of their parts.
28
Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 181.
29
Harman, The Quadruple Object, 100-102.
26
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on the sensual plane of reality, taking for granted the identity of other objects with
their qualities. In this mode of interaction, things are adjacent to each other, and
possessed of accidental or inessential traits that spill over from the qualitative
surplus of their parts.30 In cases of adjacency, the proximity of some objects to
others means that certain qualities can bleed together without thereby collapsing
into a new object. 31 On the windowsill next to the desk at which I currently
write, for example, there sits a large curved terrarium in which a bed of moss, a
few stones, a fragment of branch-wood and a small, bright green plant are
arranged in a natural-looking tableau. Across the curved glass exterior of this
object, light from a nearby lamp is reflected, casting a number of bright, yellowwhite spots across the surface of the glass. Because these are purely sensual in
nature, the interaction between the light and the glass does not render the
terrarium something other than what it would be if I were to reach over and turn
off the lamp. Even in darkness it would still be the same object. In this instance,
qualitative interaction is merely a result of adjacency—the qualities of one thing
bleeding over into another.
In the case of accidental qualities, a similar type of spillover occurs—this
time from the component objects that comprise the larger object of which they are
a part. If I notice, for example, that one edge of the terrarium’s mossy bed looks a
bit withered and yellowed in comparison to the rest of it, this qualitative
difference does not disrupt my ability to recognize the entire terrarium for what it
is. This single detail is inessential to the overall coherence of the object’s
intentional note, arising from one of its parts—the moss. From this we can see
that, as a sensual object, the terrarium includes certain qualities from its
constitutive units as essential, while rendering others inessential to its overall
viability as a relationally coherent being. The seeping-over of inessential qualities
into our perception of a thing is due to the fact that its parts always amount to
more than what they are in their compressed rendering via the unified
sensual/intentional note of the object.
Just as importantly, there is also a “real object” behind the sensual object.
This is what the thing actually is unto itself, outside of its relations to other things.
Throughout Harman’s oeuvre, the primary function of the real object is to serve as
a principle of unity for the thing-as-a-whole. In its ontologically withdrawn
capacity, it participates in a tweaked, realist version of what Heidegger called
“readiness-to-hand” (vorhandenheit), a state of functional execution that refers
30

For the technical breakdown of this terminology, see Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics,
182-183.
31
Harman’s technical term for an object that is seen in a single moment, encrusted with
accidents and inessential traits supplied by its neighbors and parts, is “element.”
(Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 194).
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beyond any individual moment in time and can only be made present in a limited
and reduced manner (zuhandenheit).32 As such, it also a revised version of
Aristotle’s “substantial form,” in which the real object’s ability to withdraw
behind the moments of its existence fortify the coherence of its metaphysical
function—meaning that the entire object, sensual and real, is the “substance”
itself.33
In this way, the real object is the most formalized element of the object-asa-whole, holding an undisclosed, non-relational set of real qualities together as
component pieces, and also seeming (in a less than precisely defined manner) to
insure the formal unity of the sensual object with its own qualities. These
functions are so purely formal in nature that the real object is said not even to be
located in time or space. Rather, it is in some sense prior to time itself, subsisting
in an immaterial, vacuum-sealed eternity, and its tensions with the sensual objects
of the relational world are actually held to be the cause of space.34 By serving as
a principle of unity, holding the sensual qualities of things together in a manner
through which they are respectively coordinated to each other in a formalized
framework of interrelations, the real object interacts with the qualities of things in
a space-producing way. Time, on the other hand, is produced solely by tensions
subsisting on the level of sensual relations, leaving out the real object altogether;
while the metaphysical essence of a thing is outside of both space and time, being
the product of the tensions generated between the real object and its qualities.35
In addition to these time-and-space-transcending features, the existence of the real
object does not seem to depend upon the actual assembly of its parts at one place
and in one time, despite being “caused” or “produced” by them whenever this
occurs. As a pure formal unity, it appears to exist whether or not this happens at
all.36
As previously said, the majority of worldly interactions involve the
adjacent and accidental seepage of qualities. The visages which things usually
present to each other are “encrusted” with accidents and inessential traits, and this
32

For Heidegger’s original explanation of these terms, see Heidegger, Being and Time
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), Section 16, “The Worldly Character of the Surrounding
World Making Itself Known in Innerworldly Beings, 67-83. For Harman’s revisionist
reading of them, see Tool Being, esp. section 3, “Equipment is Global,” (35-44),
section 4, “Reversal: Broken Tools,” (44-49), section 7, “The As-Structure”(68-80),
and section 8, “A Second Axis,” (80-87).
33
See Tool Being, Section 24, “Classical Milestones,” 268-280.
34
Harman, The Quadruple Object, 99-100.
35
See Harman, The Quadruple Object, 100.
36
“…an object is anything that has a unified reality that is autonomous from its wider
context and also from its own pieces.” (Harman, The Quadruple Object, 116).
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type of interplay surrounds them with “a black noise of muffled objects hovering
at the fringes of our attention.”37 Here, “blackness” refers to the fact that qualities
are always attached to objects whose full being is withdrawn into the darkness of
a non-relational sphere. Because the sensual proximities that result in this type of
ontological noise do not result in causal interactions, they account for what
Harman calls “buffered causation.” This is a state of affairs in which the nearness
and infinite enclosed-ness of objects is not always or immediately generative—in
which two or more objects can in fact be near to each other without causing
anything to happen at all.38 Because this is a common condition of reality,
something is needed to account for cases in which causation actually occurs. As
the filler of that role, vicarious causation is not a foil to buffered causation, but
only its active counterpoint, the flipside of the same coin. It is causation that
occurs despite the buffering, that which occasionally lifts the buffer.
The general mechanism for vicarious causation is called “allure.”39
Possessed of numerous sub-varieties, it results from the inability of the object’s
unified relational note to encompass everything that is contained in its parts. This
inability creates structural weaknesses which allow qualities to partially break free
from the qualitative unity of a sensual object. When this occurs, the quality that is
freed becomes a causal agent that interacts with another object. The manner in
which it does so involves an extremely significant technical point, one that will
inform much of the subsequent analysis carried out in this paper. This is that,
instead of attacking this unity head-on, the vicarious cause strikes at it through
the variable and inessential features exhibited by the object’s parts; i.e. through
that which is not fully incorporated by the relational note.40 As a structural
compression of various qualities, the eidetic note is itself a type of non-assailable
form, not fully withdrawn in the time-transcending manner of the “real object,”
but nonetheless fortified in its essential configuration against the vicissitudes of
any sort of causal impact. Thus, the only way that new things can come into
being is through the creation of new forms with new essential and inessential
features of their own.41 In his lengthy explanation of this process, Harman
37

Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 183.
Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 208-209; 221-225.
39
Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 141-144, and at numerous points thereafter throughout
the book.
40
Harman maintains that the sensual object continues to be the “warlord” or dominating
master of its notes even during processes of vicarious causation, but that nonetheless
ceases to be “identical” with them, meaning that they have achieved a sort of semiautonomy. (Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 176)
41
Harman does not exactly put it that way and I am engaging in a bit of interpretive
extrapolation here; but this claim is firmly grounded in a close reading of Guerilla
Metaphysics and I do not believe that he would object to it. One question that arises

38
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focusses primarily on two phenomena from human experience, humor and
metaphor, whose structure serve as generalizable analogues for vicarious
causation as a whole. Building on essays by Bergson, Ortega y Gasset, and Max
Black, Harman extracts underlying similarities from this pair of phenomena and
uses them to account for causation-as-a-whole.
The nature of the account is as follows: in cases involving both metaphor
and humor, a sensual quality is shaken free from the unified object of which it is a
part. When it does so, it begins to act either as an overwhelmingly dominant
feature of an object (humor), 42 or as a metonymic stand-in for an object as a
whole (metaphor).43 Both of these processes comprise instances of allure, in
which the loosened, semi-autonomous quality is forefronted as a feature of the
thing, thereby becoming ontologically prominent and serving as a causal lure for
other objects. As this occurs, the sensual quality begins to behave as an object in
its own right—a move enabled by the fact that it really is the quality of another
object, i.e. of the component part to which it belongs.44 This process releases new
forces into the world, resulting in the creation of new objects. Specifically: the
forefronted sensual quality comes into relation with another object, and this
contact produces a larger object of which both of the former are parts. Always
amounting to more than these, this larger assemblage comprises a new,
independent thing, possessed of its own withdrawn, non-relational form.45 As
such, it is the object that has been vicariously caused.
We now have a sense of the core terms and processes involved in
vicarious causation. Before moving on to consider their relevance to Game of
Thrones, however, I wish to highlight a few additional aspects of Harman’s
overall take on objects. The first of these concerns additional details on what
here is how destruction ought to be defined in Harman’s version of the world. When
the creation of a new object involves the radical reconfiguration of one of its ingredient
parts to such an extent that the form of the part is completely changed, does that object
actually cease to be, or does its form just completely withdraw from the relational plane
of reality while still continuing to exist? And if the latter is the case, what sort of
terminology should be used to describe this sort of withdrawal? Would the very
concept of “destruction” have to be replaced with something else? And might the thing
that is not quite “destroyed” be capable of entering into a new relational context in a
different place and time?
42
Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, Chapter 9, “Humor,” 125-144.
43
Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, Chapter 8, “Metaphor,” 101-124 Harman, Guerilla
Metaphysics, Chapter 9, “Humor,” 125-144..
44
Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, Chapter 10, Section A, “Severed Qualities,” 150-152.
45
For a numerically-sequenced breakdown of this process as it applies specifically to the
case of metaphor, see Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 176-178.
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counts as such. We recently saw that Harman holds objects to exist at every level
of physical scale, with discrete ontological units descending downwards in a
possibly infinite manner. Along with this general inclusiveness at the level of
physical size, Harman’s philosophical system also includes ideas, fictions and
abstract universals as types of objects. In his version of the cosmos, things do not
need to be materially embodied in order to exist, possessed as they are of
ultimately immaterial form.46 Hence, his system includes discrete ideas and
fictions folded into larger discrete ideas and fictions at various levels of “size,”
each comprising a unique entity in its own right. This will prove useful to keep in
mind as we begin to discuss fictional texts as types of objects.
The second point to be made here concerns the exact relationship between
mediation and causation in Harman’s theory. Above, we saw that Harman draws
a technical distinction between adjacency, accidents, and causal interaction. In
adjacent and accidental varieties of interplay, the qualities of things spill over
onto each other without producing new objects, while instances of causation
always result in the creation of new things. These metaphysical cleavages also
apply to Harman’s use of the terms mediation and communication. Both terms
designate the transfer of generative or causal force from one object to another and
exclude consideration of adjacency and accidental interaction. As one in a pair of
alternate designators, mediation highlights the reduced, sensual, and qualitatively
proximal nature of causation; whereas communication indicates the salience of the
ontological gap across which one object affects another— the incomplete
intrusion of one object into another object’s withdrawn, vacuum-sealed realityunto-itself. In short: the vicarious causal model construes media and
communication in purely causal terms, according to which the thing that is caused
is always, constantly and categorically construed as an object.
A few disclaimers are necessitated by this point. Foremost among these is
the fact that Harman’s rather technical definition of these terms is not descriptive
or diagnostically exhaustive, even within the parameters of his own system. In
my previous example of the terrarium reflecting lamplight from its glass surface,
it is possible to speak of an adjacent sensual quality as something that mediates
my experience of the thing. The reflected lamplight, that is, has an effect on my
perception of the terrarium, without necessarily producing a new object.
46

Critiques of materialism occur in almost all of Harman’s major books. For one of
these, see Harman, The Quadruple Object, 7-19. For an endorsement of abstract
entities, see the following quote: “Virtue and love are real, if vaguely grasped; we
define them in tentative fashion by way of attributes, but these traits never quite get at
the thing itself. The power of a tyrant or rhetorician is insufficient, because these are
merely superficial efforts at the mercy of a reality that only wisdom can probe, not
power.” (Harman, Prince of Networks, 93).
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Contrarily, the visual tableau resulting from this adjacency might itself be
definable as a quality that produces a new object through my experience of it. In
either case, however, there is a manifest need to incorporate the topic of
adjacency into discussions of mediation; for an adjacent quality can in some way
serve as a mediator of the thing to which it is adjacent, and the same could be said
of accidents. Given the complexity of Harman’s metaphysical model and the
technical alterations that are suggested to it below, however, this task is not
pursued here, but saved for another day. For the remainder of this particular
paper, mediation and communication are spoken of only in the strictly Harmanian
sense, as matters pertinent to the subject of causation between objects.
Much of what has thus-far been said raises additional questions about the
underlying nature of the “causation” that occurs during vicariously causal
processes. Throughout this section, we have seen that the “real object” is in some
way located outside of space and time (although a reference to “location” is
problematic in such a case). We have also seen that every relation is an object;
that causation between objects is always mediated, and that the category of
“object” does not simply include bodies extended in space, but also ideas,
fictions, and physical and psychological processes. A number of resultant
questions arise (and have been extensively hashed-out in online discussions and
flame wars around the subject of OOO). These concern the exact spatio-temporal
location of a vicariously causal act (i.e. where and when does it happen?); the
exact nature of the thing that is caused (i.e. what exactly is an object?); and the
means by which ontology and metaphysics can be distinguished from
epistemology in an object- oriented framework (how do you know that any
particular thing you’re talking about is really an object at all?).
The point to be made here is that, in Harman’s version of OOO, there is no
definitive answer to any of these questions. In fact, an underlying motivation of
his entire philosophical project is to encourage an acceptance of the underlying
ambiguities that flow from them. Tool Being ends by posing a question as to
where, exactly, an object withdraws. 47 Since its publication, Harman has never
answered it. As inherently relational factors of existence, he argues, space and
time cannot fully encompass an object. But this does not mean that he is going to
tell us exactly what exists outside them. In his view, we can never know with
absolute certainty what is or is not a real object—yet he repeatedly refers to
objects of every conceivable sort as if they were real things. Harman tends to
47

Harman, Tool Being, 294.
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present these ambiguities as general factors-of-existence that cast the ultimate
nature of things in a somewhat occluded light, without catastrophically sabotaging
our ability to speculate about their structure. Despite its move towards a
somewhat more positive characterization of objects, the general spirit of this
tendency is preserved in the current paper.
A specific structural point that needs to be further discussed on this front
is the binary nature of vicarious causation. Because substances are discrete units,
every moment of causal contact is ultimately dyadic in nature, even when
multiple points of contact occur at the same time. When two objects mutually
affect each other in the course of an encounter, this is actually not one event, but
comprises two separate relations, or objects. In each of these events, one object
always acts as the agent, and the other as the patient—and this division helps to
account for why mutual impact has to be ontologically counted as two separate
events in the first place. Harman calls this rule “The Binary Contact Principle.”48
It will play a significant role in technical discussions below.
Another necessary disclaimer concerns the complex relationship of
Harman’s causal theory to the history of discourses about communication and
mediation, from Plato and Aristotle’s writings on these subjects up through the
occasionalist, scholastic, and phenomenological commentaries on them. More
recently, one could also consider its relevance to Piercian and Saussurian
semiotics, post-structuralist theories of the sign, McLuhanite media theory and the
various intellectual histories that have attended all of these. Here I will simply
acknowledge that there is much to be said on all of these topics, and affirm a
future intention to comment on them in a less empirically-focused paper. Before
departing from such matters, however, I will briefly share my conviction that the
classical elements in Harman’s work provide new ways of thinking about some of
the epoch-spanning anxieties and dilemmas that have suffused Western discourses
about communication, such as those discussed in John Durham Peter’s Speaking
Into the Air (1997). Particularly relevant, in this regard, is Peter’s discussion of
the main media-related anxieties expressed in Plato’s Phaedrus, i.e. the corrosive
effects of writing on memory and on the authentically dialectical co-presence of
human souls.49 Put very briefly: Harman’s entire philosophy—and especially the
theory of vicarious causation—speak rather forcefully to underlying longings that
inform this variety of Platonic media-phobia. For Harman’s philosophical
48
49

Harman, Prince of Networks, 209.
John Durham Peters, Speaking Into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
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position holds that nothing is ever fully co-present in the first place. Rather,
everything is always-already mediated and reduced from the moment it
encounters anything else. Thus, while retaining and fusing certain elements of
Platonic and Aristotelian thought, his ideas also contain suggestions as to how one
might negotiate the deep-seated pathologies of Western ideation on the subject of
media.
Lastly, a final significant point concerns an issue that was briefly
mentioned in the previous section. It is tied up with the overall relationship of
Harman’s work to the phenomenological tradition of which it is a realistrevisionist outgrowth. Above, we saw above that the definition of a sensual
object involves significant appropriations from the work of Edmund Husserl.
This comes, however, with an extremely significant departure on the issue of
eidetic reduction. Husserl argues that it is possible to arrive at an intellectual
intuition of an intentional object’s eidos by considering it from a number of
different angles and abstracting from their particulars. In keeping with his claim
that the eidos is always immediately present in any apprehension of a thing,
Harman explicitly disagrees with Husserl on this point, denying the possibility of
any eidetic apprehension abstracted from an immanent encounter with an object’s
sensual qualities:
Late in the Logical Investigations, Husserl makes it clear that the
eidos of an object is incapable of sensual presence; we have access
to it only through categorical intuition, such that only the work of
the intellect delivers the eidos. But in fact, there is no reason to
assume that the intellect can make reality present in a way that the
senses cannot… In other words, Husserl is wrong to distinguish
between the sensual and the intellectual here; both sensual and
categorical intuition are forms of intuition, and to intuit something
is not the same as to be it. Hence the eidetic features of any object
can never be made present even through the intellect, but can only
be approached indirectly by way of allusion, whether in the arts or
in the sciences.50
Although Harman’s position is perfectly consistent from a technical point
of view, it does create certain difficulties when it comes to putting his ideas to
work in the analysis of actual objects. For in his take on the real object that lies
beneath the sensual or intentional one, Harman has always very forcefully denied
the possibility of apprehending or otherwise encountering the withdrawn essence
of a thing. When this understandable caution at the level of the real object is
50

Harman, The Quadruple Object, 27-28.
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coupled with the further, technically-motivated argument that the structural center
of the relational object is also unknowable except through direct sensual
apprehension, one is left wondering what exactly one can say about an object at
all, other than that it exists and is held together by unknowable forms at the
relational and non-relational levels of its being. This results in further dilemmas
as to how the theory of vicarious causation can be brought to bear on the analysis
of actual causal processes. Questions arise as to usefulness, and accusations as to
“uselessness” erupt.51
The solution that I will here propose involves a specific form of “as if”
speculation. It goes like this: when applying the vicarious model to various types
of mediated causal interaction, I suggest a willing-but-conditional suspension of
disbelief, whereby one can tentatively identify a particular quality of a thing as
being somewhat inessential to its sensually manifest nature, and other qualities as
comprising its more central or core components. This proposal involves the selfconsciously unverifiable, cautious claim that certain intellectually-ascertainable
qualities of a thing play something of central role in its relational structure. In
doing so, these elements also share in the overall unity-within-plurality partaken
of by eidetic qualities, but are possessed of a structural centrality or prominence
of a different sort. As we will shortly see, the resultant empirical parsing of
central and inessential qualities involves a speculative process of reverseengineering through the comparison of causally-related objects, through which
indexes of differing qualities are established and cross-referenced with each other.
When this has been carried out, one can then attempt to trace the contours of
vicarious transformations at the level of qualitative interaction.
When it comes to positing the exact relationship between the sensual qualities
that have been analyzed in this manner to real qualities and essences in the nonrelational domain, this approach holds that the structurally central qualities of a
sensual object are those that are most likely to have analogues—or something
akin to analogues— in the real one. In this way, one can preserve a degree of the
caution for which Harman is a philosophical advocate, while also using his ideas
to yield positive insights into the changes undergone by actual objects. This is the
approach that I now apply to “Game of Thrones.”
Ice, Fire, and The Wars of the Roses
The shift to our empirical materials is best begun with a few paragraphs of
introduction to the series of novels that serve as their ur-text. Unto itself, this
51

Here I will ask the reader to trust me regarding the contents of a few conversations that
I have had with some skeptical interlocutors on certain social networking sites.
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series is not known by the name Game of Thrones, but rather, “A Song of Ice and
Fire.” The use of the former name as a designator for the cultural-phenomenonas-a-whole has resulted from the popularity of the HBO series, which took an
abbreviated version of the first book, A Game of Thrones, as an overall title across
its seasons. For purposes of clarity, I will henceforth use “A Song of Ice and
Fire,” or sometimes just “Song,” when referring only to the books, while using
Game of Thrones to refer to the TV series and its cross-marketed spinoff products.
The relationship of “Song” to the historical Wars of the Roses is the main focus of
this section. We will turn to further adaptations in the following section. Before
starting out, I hereby warn any concerned reader that this section contains massive
spoilers. With that said, I begin:
Since the publication of the first book in 1996, the “Song of Ice and Fire”
novels have experienced huge success as publishing phenomena. All but the first
of the five current books in the series has topped the New York Times Bestseller
list, and the publication of the latest installment in the series broke sales records
for 2011, leading to speculation that George R.R. Martin was single-handedly
saving the sale of print books.52 Though bolstered by the popularity of the
television series, the bestselling status of the books was already well-established
prior to HBO’s adaptation of the books. Given the already-existing nature of the
resultant fan-base, the popularity of the series doubtlessly served as a motivation
for adapting them in the first place.
In addition to their commercial success, the books have also garnered
widespread critical acclaim. Reviewers have praised them for their incorporation
of morally ambiguous themes, psychologically complex characters, and issues of
contemporary social and political relevance into works of popular fantasy.53 At
52

Carol Memmett, “Record Sales for George R.R. Martin’s A Dance With Dragons.”
USA Today, July 14, 2011, http://books.usatoday.com/bookbuzz/post/2011/07/recordsales-for-george-rr-martins-a-dance-with-dragons/176909/1; and Charlie Anders, “Is
George R.R. Martin helping to save print book sales?” i09, We Come From the Future,
September 6, 2011, http://io9.com/5837748/is-george-rr-martin-helping-to-save-printbook-sales.
53
To quote just one of the many, overwhelmingly positive reviews of the series,
Lev Grossman wrote of the fourth book in Time: “What really distinguishes
Martin, and what marks him as a major force for evolution in fantasy, is his
refusal to embrace a vision of the world as a Manichaean struggle between
Good and Evil. Tolkien's work has enormous imaginative force, but you have
to go elsewhere for moral complexity. Martin's wars are multifaceted and
ambiguous, as are the men and women who wage them and the gods who
watch them and chortle, and somehow that makes them mean more. A Feast
for Crows isn't pretty elves against gnarly orcs. It's men and women slugging it
out in the muck, for money and power and lust and love.” Lev Grossman, “The
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both the popular and critical level, one reason for the success of the series derives
from the finesse with which it accomplishes a double-edged task, introducing
darkly realistic, contemporary overtones into the storyline while nonetheless
managing to conjure the sense of adventure and enchantment that is expected
from works of fantasy literature.
This double-edged objective informs every element of the story, from plot
and characterization to its overall setting. The latter is a late-medieval world,
located either on another planet or in an alternate universe. Known as the “World
of Westeros,” it is somewhat atypical of settings in the mainstream fantasy genre,
in that it appears to be fairly well-advanced down the path toward an earlymodern phase in its history. At the time when the story begins, the old myths and
legends have fallen under a pall of doubt. Magic no longer seems to work. Power
is wielded in an increasingly cynical and instrumental manner. Rationalism,
mercantilism, and a centralized state apparatus are all on the rise, and something
resembling a Weberian disenchantment seems to be sitting on the near temporal
horizon.54 But just as this outcome begins to seem like a fait accompli, the
situation radically reverses itself. All of the fading legends turn out to be true.
Magic, mysticism, and mythological beings return into the world, affecting the
outcomes of the series’ major conflicts and adventures.55 The overall trajectory of
history and reality seems to shift—as if the universe in which the story is set has
made a different determination about the ultimate nature of existence.
Yet these developments do not unfold in the manner of a simple antimodern fairytale. Throughout each of the books in the series, the resurgence of a
mythic, pre-modern worldview is laced with elements of the modernity whose
American Tolkein,” Time, November 13, 2005. For more on the way in which
the political and moral landscapes of Westeros resonate with those of modern
America, also see Grossman’s NPR review of the fifth book: Lev Grossman,
“George R.R. Martin’s Complex Epic for an Ambivalent Age.” On NPR’s All
Things Considered, July 7, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/07/11/137652436/rr-martins-sardonic-epic-for-an-ambivalent-age. For other wholly or mostly
positive reviews, see Jeff Vandermeer, “‘A Dance With Dragons,’ By George
R.R. Martin,” The Los Angeles Times, July 12, 2011; and David Orr, “Dragon
Ascendant: George R.R. Martin and the Rise of Fantasy,” The New York
Times, January 21, 2012.
54
This is especially the feeling of the first book. Although its narrative is bookended by
a pair of fantastical scenes, it is otherwise dominated by its portrait of politics,
statecraft and warfare in an apparently secularizing age. See: George R.R. Martin, A
Game of Thrones (New York: Bantam, 1996).
55
This process really gets under way in the second half of the second book and persists
throughout the rest of the series. See: George R.R. Martin, A Clash of Kings (New
York: Bantam, 2011).
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arrival it appears to forestall. Dragons, for example, are shown to be the
fantastical equivalents of airborne WMDs, raining fiery mass death from the skies
at the behest of conquering armies.56 Giants and elfin forest dwellers resemble
threatened indigenous ethnic groups. An evil supernatural enemy uses an army
made up of those most soulless and metaphorically modern of monsters—
zombies—to wage war against humanity; and this ultimate threat posed by this
evil is a world-wide, potentially ecocidal climate catastrophe. 57
Along with this rather contemporary rendering of fantastical motifs, the
more realistic elements of the novels are also loaded with modern resonance. The
wars engaged in by the human characters result in events similar to recent
instances of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Realistically squalid depictions of a
society dominated by feuding noble houses bear a more- than-passing
resemblance to a world run by over-mighty corporations.58 Characters inhabiting
this social landscape suffer from survival guilt, post-traumatic stress disorder,
narcissism, megalomania, psychopathy, and cognitive dissonance. And
throughout most of the series, human beings— and especially their political
elites— demonstrate a repeated inability to rise above self-interest and reckon
squarely with the potentially terminal threats by which they are collectively faced.
But despite the notes of modern complexity and ambiguity that these
narrative elements introduce into Martin’s fantasy world, they do not do so
entirely at the expense of the story’s genre elements; for through a combination of
deft pacing, frequent and suspenseful shifts in perspective, occasional touches of
larger-than-life melodrama and some willfully naïve indulgences of the story’s
more fantastical motifs, Martin is able to deliver on the affects typical of mass-

56

This comparison was also made by one of the writers and executive producers of the
Game of Thrones television show, D.B. Weiss, during an “Inside the Episode”
interview snippet. See: “Walk of Punishment, Inside the Episode,” Game of Thrones,
first broadcast April 4, 2013, by HBO.
57
Referred to as “Others” and “White Walkers,” the monsters differ from modern
zombies in that they are depicted as being pale and having cold blue eyes. But they are
essentially animated corpses who spread their condition to the living like a plague, and
are therefore essentially zombies. The climate threat is a supernaturally induced,
apocalyptic ice-age that, if it happens, will kill everything in the world.
58
In the same “Inside the Episode” sequence that was mentioned two footnotes above,
Weiss explains the behavior of a powerful lord regent in the following way: “Like the
C.E.O. that he is coming to run the company that he runs [i.e. the entire kingdom], he
wants to show people exactly who’s boss and he wants to put people off their guard
and he wants to give… a contest between all the players of his council to see who sits
where. And I think the way that they react to it tells him and tells us a lot about who
they are.” “Walk of Punishment, Inside the Episode,” Game of Thrones.
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market fantasy fiction while simultaneously deepening their resonances and
implications.
This balanced combination of real and fantastical depiction is evident in a
narrative aspect of the series to which we now going to turn, in order to flesh out
its metaphysical implications. This is one of its most central conflicts: the war
that occurs between the two main aristocratic families upon whom the narrative
primarily focuses, the Lannisters and the Starks. In plotting this element of the
story, Martin used the actual events of the first War of the Roses as a rough
narrative template. For reasons that will shortly become evident, I will list some
of the most basic resemblances here.
First off: the fictional setting in which the conflict occurs is a fantastical
rendering of fourteenth-century England, in which the Isle of Britain has been
magnified to the size of an entire continent. The history of this fictional
continent—the name of which is “Westeros”—contains numerous analogues to
the events of actual British history, including the eleventh-century Norman
invasion, the establishment of a line of kings stretching forward from William the
Conqueror, and the late-fourteenth-century usurpation of Richard II, whose
counterpart in the series is also a mentally unstable tyrant. As in real English
history, the fictional version of this usurpation sets off a royal legitimacy crisis
that ultimately results in a bloody civil war; and this war involves two powerful
families whose names (Lannister and Stark) clearly resemble those of the
belligerent historical houses of Lancaster and York.59
Along with these macrocosmic similarities, many of the smaller details of
the fictional conflict resemble those of the real one, including the execution of one
of the family’s powerful patriarchs and the ascension of his teenaged son (Richard
of York in reality, Ned Stark in “Song”); as well as the presence of a highly
ambitious and unusually powerful queen, whose enemies accuse her of having
engaged in adultery and placed a bastard son on the throne (Margarate of Anjou in
reality; Cersei Lannister in “Song”). These and other resemblances to the actual
Wars of the Roses pervade Martin’s works, and are in fact so numerous that my
own copy of Alison Weir’s popular history of the conflict is loaded with margin
notes identifying the fictional counterparts of the real-world characters.60
59

My knowledge of the Wars of the Roses and the events leading up to it is derived from
a reading of Alison Weir’s detailed contemporary account of the conflict. Alison Weir,
The Wars of the Roses (New York: Ballantine, 2011).
60
For example, in the margin-space next to this quote, “Margaret’s son, Edward of
Lancaster, inured to violence at an early age, shocked his contemporaries by his callous
precocity,” I have written “Joffrey,” which is the name of a psychopathically callous
boy-king from the novels. (Weir, The Wars of the Roses, xviii).
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Before moving on to discuss the metaphysical implications of such
resemblances, it will also prove useful to index a number of differences between
the narrative of the books and the course of actual events. In terms of its
relatively realistic, non-fantastical story-elements, “A Song of Ice and Fire”
makes a number of significant changes. It compresses the timespan that stretches
between the usurpation and the outbreak of dynastic war, and uses marriage
arrangements to significantly complicate the number of newly-royal families
involved in the overthrow of the old dynasty.61 In doing so, it raises the number
of belligerent claimants to the throne, thereby magnifying the scale of the overall
conflict.
The fictional version of events also resolves a number of persistent
historical ambiguities. The queen, for instance, is definitively shown to be the
mother of a bastard, while the historical record provides much room for doubt on
that front.62 And despite its moral ambiguities, the series presents one of the
belligerent families in a basically protagonistic manner while portraying the other
as villainous. With one significant exception, the Lannisters are revealed to be a
pack of vicious and arrogant killers, to whom the Starks provide a humane and
noble contrast. According to informed contemporary opinion, the real-world
houses of Lancaster and the York exhibited no such monopolies on virtue.63
On top of these significant alterations to history, the story’s fantastical
ingredients introduce a more dramatic set of changes. Martin’s version of events
involves the establishment of a rival regime-in-exile by the heir of the originally
usurped quasi-Norman dynasty. As their heir establishes her rule, she does as the
owner and adopted parent of three young dragons, while commanding a horde of
emancipated warrior-slaves and quasi-Mongolian horsemen.64 Other fantastical
elements include the previously-mentioned army of medieval zombies, as well as
a number of sorcerers, wargs, giants, and mystical wood-dwellers, each of whom
plays significant roles in the plot. It goes without saying that these are events and
characters for which there are no parallels in actual English history.

61

In the second book in series, the continent of Westeros splits into five separate factions,
each vying for power, with narrative consequences stretching in the later books.
62
In fact, Weir’s account of events Margaret’s marriage to Edward VI tends to cast this
possibility in mostly dubious light. (Weir, The War of the Roses, 118)
63
During the twentieth century, resurfaced facts about Henry V’s bloody campaigns in
France did some damage to his erstwhile reputation as a hero-king. (Weir, The Wars of
the Roses, 70). With regard to the other noble house, one need only to recall that the
nephew-murdering Richard III was a member of the House of York.
64
The name of this character is Daenerys Targaryan, and her rise to power begins in the
third book. See George R.R. Martin, A Storm of Swords (Bantam: New York, 2000).
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With all of these similarities and changes in mind, we can now consider
their bearing on the topic of vicarious causation. There are a number of points to
be made on this front. To start, I ask the reader to recall a point that was made in
the previous section. This is that, in Harman’s metaphysics, events and relations
always count as objects. According to this stipulation, the Wars of the Roses can
easily be identified as an object, the ingredient parts of which include people,
families, battles, horses, weapons, egos, the tide of public opinion, shifts in
military fortune and royal wills-to-power. Likewise, the “Song of Ice and Fire”
can be identified as another object, whose parts are books, chapters, pages,
characters, narrative events and component ideas. The fact that one of these
objects is typically conceived as being “historical” in nature while the other is
“textual” has no bearing here. According to the theory with which we are
working, both are equally objects.
Considered in this light, the object known as “The Wars of the Roses” can
be said to have a causal relationship to the “Song of Fire Ice,” serving as an
underlying structural template for the war between the Lannisters and the Starks.
This claim does not entail the argument that the Wars are responsible for having
“caused” the “Song” in its entirety, but rather indicates a more modest,
inspirationally causative relationship to an important aspect of plot.
With that in mind, I ask the reader to recall another key point from above:
Harman’s argument that vicariously causal processes always cause change by
utilizing the sensual qualities of an object, bypassing the general structure of that
object’s relational eidos and its undisclosed, ontologically withdrawn essence.
This claim can be interestingly applied, in a retroactive or reverse-engineered sort
of way, to the causal relationship whose inter-relational details we have just
examined. For in considering those details, we saw that while a great number of
changes occur at the level of fact and fantastical inclusion, the one thing that is
preserved from history to fictional text is the structural motif of a dynastic conflict
carried out by a pair of aristocratic families, in which the ultimate stake is
sovereign power.
My suggestion is that this structural motif can be construed, at the very
least, as comprising a plausible candidate for something truly essential about the
discrete ontological unit that is the Wars of the Roses. For although certain
factual details may be alterable from one object to the other; although certain
inessential parts, such as the exact identities of characters and the exact order of
events might change; and although certain sequences may be susceptible to the
grafting-on of fantastical elements, the formal, structural element of “aristocratic
families fighting for a throne” remains the same. This suggests that, having
survived a vicariously causal process of creation, this element has a prominent, or
perhaps central, place in the eidetic structure of the object that is changed via its
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mediation through a fictional text. If this were not the case, then the Wars of the
Roses would no longer stand in a causal relationship to the fictional narrative
pattern for which it is an inspiration; it would not be the thing on which that
narrative is based.
Further support for this suggestion can be found in another significant
detail. This concerns the fact that, despite the inclusion of additional royal
claimants and the expansion of the overall scale of the conflict, the LannisterStark power struggle retains a clearly-delineated, noticeable autonomy in the
midst of these larger narrative transformations, serving as a significant focal point
for drama, antagonism, and narrative action. Although situated in the midst of an
expanded civil war involving additional aspirants to power, that is, this struggle
maintains an eidetic unity of its own, a core feature of which is its binary or twoparty nature. Again, this suggests that something structurally central to the causal
agent has been preserved in the patient through which it is mediated. Changes
occur at the level of variable sensual qualities, while leaving something
structurally intact. These sensual changes and this preserved structure are both
part-and-parcel of the new object that is created. Because this new object
includes both these changes and this preserved structure, it is more than either of
them, and has a form of its own.
In making these claims, I wish to stress that I do not construe the structural
motif identified here as the full-on essence of the real thing-unto-itself, nor do I
claim that it amounts to the entirety of the sensual object’s eidos. My suggestion
is more modest in nature, holding only that this particular motif has the air of
something central about it, and might plausibly comprise a deeply structural
feature of the object in question. As to where this structure ought to be located in
terms of an object’s metaphysical dimensions, my contention is that it is quite
likely a regular or invariable feature of its eidos, showing up consistently in
different relational configurations and enduring the absorption of causal impact,
while possibly maintaining a deeper connection to the withdrawn qualities and
underlying form of the thing, perhaps having some analogue or parallel quality at
this level. Through its deployment of such qualifiers as “might,” “has the air”
“possibly” and “quite likely,” my advancement of these claims is informed by the
negotiatiory intentions mentioned at the end of the previous section. Here, I have
attempted to show that something resembling a major structural quality can be
provisionally identified without recourse to a full-on eidetic reduction—meaning
that positive indications about aspects of a central structure can be made in the
absence of complete access to it.
This analysis has a few implications for the ways in which the study of
cultural and textual mediation can be put to work in the positive use of the
vicarious causal theory. Most obviously, it implies that examining specific cases
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of mediation can provide provisional methods for identifying what is knowable
about the essential and inessential ingredients of an object’s formal structure.
Once the features that have been vicariously changed have been identified, focus
can be brought to bear on individual parts and their qualitative variables, thereby
providing the means for describing the contours of a vicarious transformation.
In the current case, for example, we can examine the specific changes that
are made to the historical record, such as the definitive presence of an adulterous
queen, the imposition of a protagonistic binary on the belligerent families, and the
introduction of fantastical elements with contemporary resonance. Unto itself,
this list does not tell us anything remarkable, and could have been formulated in
the absence of a metaphysical theory. But when these changes are modeled
according to the theory of vicarious causation, they provide metaphysical insight
into the way in which one ontological unit brings informational filters, biases,
agendas, and conceptual schema to bear upon another. This suggests, first of all,
that there is something more to the object that has been mediated than its
mediation by another object; that it is a unique entity that continues to be itself
despite its mediation. It also suggests that the set of textual factors that mediate
this entity comprises an entity in its own right. That is: the mediation of the Wars
of the Roses by “A Song of Ice and Fire”’ is an object, possessed of its own
allure.
This object is somewhat difficult to identify, ontologically speaking,
having something to do with the intentions of a specific author, but also
possessing a reality of its own. Nonetheless, it can be theorized and modeled as a
discrete unit of being, and a number of its parts can be identified. The various
narrative changes that were mentioned above can be counted among the latter, as
can the authorial intention to make certain thematic points while telling an
absorbing story with contemporary resonances. Furthermore, this mediating
textual object can be construed as something that amounts to more than the sum
of its parts—held together by an executant form that is never fully present at any
of its moments—while itself being only a part of the larger text to which it
belongs. For “A Song of Ice and Fire” does more than simply mediate the Wars
of the Roses, comprising a complex, autonomous narrative in its own right. As a
whole, it too is an object with a unique form of its own.
Mediational Allure, Causation in Networks; and the Metaphysical
Significance of Open-Ended Games
Despite their potentially supra-human implications, we will continue to examine
the specifically human-derived Wars/“Song”/Game nexus, in order to examine the
ways in which it exemplifies a particular type of allure. Above, we saw that
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allure involves the fore-fronting of a sensual quality belonging to one of the parts
of a causal agent. When this occurs, the quality is partly loosened from the part to
which it belongs and intrudes into the world of another object, coming into
relation with it. This relation produces a larger object, the thing that is caused.
In cases of what I call “mediational allure,” the essential steps of this
process are observed with a twist. Specifically: one object (1) mediates the causal
force of another object (2) to a third (3) via qualitative variations enacted on the
mediated object (2). This might sound like a rather technical mouthful, but it is
actually not that difficult to comprehend, especially when applied to our empirical
case. Consider the following scenario: George R.R. Martin writes a series of
books inspired by the Wars of the Roses, which are then read by a reader.
Throughout the past section, we saw that when this happens, certain seemingly
inessential details concerning the historical source materials are altered.
Timelines are compressed, ambiguities are resolved, different events are rendered
more or less consequential or complex, fantastical elements are introduced, and
contemporary themes and concerns are overlaid onto the narrative. The results of
these changes inform the events and narrative sequences of “A Song of Ice and
Fire,” and are what the reader immediately encounters when she reads the novels.
Thus, when the sensual or relational qualities of the novels becoming alluring
causal agents in their own right, entering the mind of a reader, they do so as
altered variations on the sensual or relational qualities of the Wars of the Roses,
or as hybrids mixing aspects of the Wars with qualities of a different sort. In this
sense, the reader has an inflected or mediated causal encounter with the Wars via
the “Song of Ice and Fire,” which serves here as a causal mediator (1). Having
partly inspired the events of the novels, the Wars (2) impact the reader (3) from
one degree of ontological remove.
Because it involves a triadic situation, this causal process may seem to
defy Harman’s Binary Contact Principle, which holds that there are only ever two
objects involved in any causal act. But when one considers the different ways in
which this particular transformation can be modeled, it becomes clear that this is
in fact not the case. Before unpacking these perspectives, I ask the reader to keep
in mind that they are not contradictory alternatives, but are rather compatible
complements to each other, or different ways of looking at the same thing. With
that said:
From one perspective, our example can be understood to comprise two
separate, successive instances of Binary Contact. In the initial instance, the Wars
are the agent and the books are the patient. This occurs when the Wars have a
causal impact on the narrative of the books, serving as an inspiration for the
Lannister-Stark conflict. This is followed by a second instance in which the
books switch roles, becoming agents that have a causal impact on the minds of the
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reader, who is the patient affected by the process of reading them. As mediating
agents, the books present a mediated version of the Wars’ events, in which certain
inessential qualities have been altered.
But when we recall that the vicarious model of causation holds every
relation to be an object, we can see that, from another perspective, these two cases
of Binary Contact can actually be simplified into one. This is due to the fact that
the relation between the Wars and the books is actually an object in its own right.
Thus, when the reader reads the books, she is also having a vicarious causal
encounter with the object/relation/mediation comprised by the Wars and the
books. In other words, there is already a single instance of Binary Contact
underway in a situation that also involves two separate instances of it, meaning
that a triadic mediation is always simultaneously a dyadic encounter.
Furthermore, the dyadic encounter can be modeled from yet another perspective,
in which the Wars-books relation is one object, the books-reader relation is
another, and the causal encounter is what unfolds between the two of them.
Hence, at the same time that the reader is having a causal encounter with the
books, the books-reader relation that results from this encounter is having its own
encounter with the Wars-book relation. And finally, because every object is a
relation, the Wars-books/books-reader relation is also a Wars-books-reader object.
Or in other words, the object is the medium.
Again, these models do not contradict each other, but are perfectly
compatible ways of looking at the same phenomenon. With their main import in
mind, we can address a few potential objections to the manner in which they have
been presented. These include the fact that the causal relation between the Wars
and the books is itself not direct in nature, but mediated by the authorial labor of
George R.R. Martin, and that Martin’s relationship to the Wars is in turn mediated
by other books that he doubtlessly read on them. Our answer is: of course this is
the case, but every one of those sub-mediations is another instance of Binary
Contact between objects, folded into Binary Contact between larger objects. The
mechanics of mediational allure are therefore perfectly compatible with those of
vicarious causation. As a designator, “mediational allure” simply highlights the
way in which larger objects and relations are mediated through the smaller objects
and relations that are their parts. In doing so, it also points out the inevitably
hybrid nature of the qualities involved.
To illustrate: when a reader reads “A Song of Ice and Fire,” she
encounters the book series as its causal patient. But while this occurs, she
simultaneously encounters the transformational relationship of the books’
qualities to those of the Wars of the Roses. Thus, even if the reader knows
nothing of medieval history, she nonetheless undergoes a causal encounter with
the Wars’ relation to the books every time she reads them. And quite literally, this
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larger causal relation is a component of what is alluring about the books,
comprising an ingredient element in their tension and drama. As such, they are
included in what comes loose from their eide and takes on a life of its own in the
imagination of the reader.
If there is the hint of a divergence from Harman here, it involves our prior
inference that mediation itself might provide one way of (cautiously and
tentatively) locating essential properties. What mediational allure adds to the
overall theory of vicarious causation is that something like a causal encounter
with real or fundamental qualities may also be involved in indirect impact. When
one reads the “Song of Ice and Fire,” one has a positive perceptual encounter with
a war between aristocratic families fighting for sovereign power, a narrative
element which, we previously suggested, might possibly comprise an essential
element of the mediated object. Interestingly, however, the nature of this
encounter is itself mediated through smaller textual objects. We never encounter
the war itself, but rather the characters who observe the battles and political
calculations that comprise it. In this way, the war behaves in a manner similar to
that of an underlying structural form, thereby seeming to support its association
with deep structures.
These most recent findings interact interestingly with another implication
of the preceding analysis. Most of what we have just discussed seems to involve
a fairly linear process of causation, wherein one object mediates the qualities of
another down though a chronologically successive line of impacts and effects. A
more expansive sense of this can be gleaned by considering the ways in which “A
Song of Ice and Fire” has been adapted in multiple media, through television,
videogames, comic books, and more. The point to made, in this regard, is that
such adaptations lend themselves to at least two types of causal modeling. The
first is the type that we have already seen: cumulative linear impact stretching
forward in time: the Wars of the Roses occur; Martin writes a series of novels that
are inspired by them; these novels inspire and affect a major television adaptation;
and this major television adaptation affects the manner in which a number of
further adaptations are carried out, influencing their depiction of characters and
events. In this chain of object-relations, each step along the way affects what
comes after it. When playing the video-Game of Thrones, for example, the player
is affected by the cumulative history of successive impacts, stretching from the
Wars themselves up through the books. Although the storyline of the game
actually unfolds during the run-up to the events of the books and show
(comprising a kind of para-textual prequel to them), these still inform its contents,
which is therefore impacted by the entire causal chain. To specify: important
elements of the game-narrative anticipate a pending conflict between two
medieval-aristocratic families fighting for a throne (causal impact of the Wars);
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the families are named Lannister and Stark and occupy a detailed fantasy world
whose features are derived from the books (causal impact of the books); and two
actors from the television show do the voice acting for their characters in the
game, and are designed to look like their televisual counterparts (causal impact of
the show).65 Ontologically speaking, this causal model could be characterized as
a form of linearly networked causation.
There is another sense, however, in which every causal stopping point or
node in this network provides its own, separate and unique mediation of each of
the prior nodes, in a manner that is not reliant, in terms of its formally configured
effect, upon the efficiently causal chain. To get a sense of this, consider the
example of a player playing the Game of Thrones videogame. While this occurs,
this player experiences a direct mediation of the Wars of the Roses through the
game’s anticipatory plot points. That is: events in the game storyline build
towards a conflict between two aristocratic families. The game contains
characters partly based on members of those families, and as a medium, has its
own way of depicting those events and characters. Thus, whether or not the
player has ever read the books or seen the show, she has a mediated causal
encounter with the Wars of the Roses, enacted directly and uniquely through the
game. As a discrete existent entity, the game imposes its own conditions upon the
manner in which the Wars impact the player, exuding its own alluringly hybrid
qualities compounded from itself and the Wars; and the manner in which it does
so is determined by its formal configuration.
But as it mediates the Wars, the game is also, simultaneously, mediating
the contents of the books and the contents of the show, and doing so as separate
acts of mediation. In a scene from the fourth level game, for instance, a character
tells a bleak, social-realist story about tragic events that led him down a sad life
path—a very George R.R. Martin moment. While he does this, he is sitting in a
brothel as a barely-clad prostitute gyrates like a stripper behind him—a very
HBO/Game of Thrones moment. Again: the game is carrying out its own causal
mediation of the Wars, the books, and the show, despite having been historically
impacted by the causal chain that connects them in a successive network. In
terms of their developmental history, these separate mediations may have causal
relationships to each other, but in terms of their immediate efficacy and formal
dimensions, their mediational actions are also unique.
As with previous findings, this discovery has broader implications for the
fields of media and communications studies. With regard to the study of
65

The actors are Conleth Hill, who plays the spy-master Varys, and James Cosmo, who
plays Jeor Mormont, the Lord Commander of the Night’s Watch. See Atlus, Game of
Thrones, 2012.
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networked causation, it implies that a node in any particular causal chain can have
a more complex relationship to its past than might be expected, serving as a direct
mediator of distantly past content despite the presence of intermediary nodes in a
linear causal process. When the notion of formal causation is taken seriously, the
temporality of networks is significantly complicated.
To complicate matters even further, we will now shift to another
adaptation: A Game of Thrones: the Board Game. Any reader who has been
paying close attention to titles will notice a difference here: the presence of the
article “A,” which was dropped from the TV series and the videogame. Its
presence in the board game’s title is due to the fact that this game was adapted
from the books in 2003, several years prior to the production of the TV series, and
therefore escaped mediation through it. In this way, the board game comprises a
different branch off of the linear causal network than the one that begins with the
show. When compared to the other, later branch, it emits interesting metaphysical
suggestions of its own.
We can get an initial sense of these suggestions from the “Overview”
passage of the game’s rule book:
A Game of Thrones: The Board Game is a game for three to six players,
based on George R.R. Martin’s bestselling A Song of Ice and Fire
novels. In A Game of Thrones: The Board Game, players each control
one of six Great Houses seeking dominance over the lands of Westeros.
By mustering armies, conquering territory and forming alliances, each
House strives to control the most Castles and Strongholds so it may
ultimately claim the Iron Throne.66

The metaphysical interest of this overview derives from what it reveals about the
nature of the game, particularly as it differs from the Song of Ice and Fire and the
other adaptations of it. What we see here, immediately, is that the board game
emphasizes the relatively expanded conflict of the novels, with a greater number
of noble houses competing for the throne than was the case in the Wars of the
Roses. By making this change, it also omits the distinctness of the two-family
power-struggle from its own internal structure. In other words: the game system
does not revolve around a “Lannister-Stark” dyad, and unlike other adaptations,
its drama and narrative tension does not hinge around the victory of one of the
other of these two houses.
Interestingly, then, the board game omits a structural element which, in the
previous section, was tentatively nominated as a likely candidate for being a
central eidetic quality of the Wars of the Roses, and possibly a correlate to a real
66

Fantasy Flight Games, Rules of Play for George R.R. Martin’s A Game of Thrones: The
Board Game, 2.
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quality as well. When advancing this tentative identification, I suggested that if
this structural factor were left out of an adapted text, this text could not be said to
be based on the Wars of the Roses. As a text which omits this centrally important
structural factor, A Game of Thrones: the Board Game would precisely be such a
text. The question then arises: what is it based on? And the rule book itself
provides the answer: “A Game of thrones: the Board Game is based on George
R.R. Martin’s A Song of Ice and Fire novels.” This may seem fairly obvious at
first, but the metaphysical implications are actually fairly subtle, and concern the
manner in which certain eide are bypassed and eventually omitted from causal
networks through the production of new objects, even as new processes of
causation continues to transmit other eidetic structures down the line. For while
the board game omits what appears to be a central eidetic structure of the Wars of
the Roses, it includes what would appear to be a central eidetic structure of the
Song of Ice and Fire. Here we should recall the prior claim that the Song is not
just a mediator of the Wars; that it has qualities, carries out tasks, and conceals an
ultimate form of its own. And just as the Song preserves a structure of the Wars,
the board game preserves a structure of the Song—namely: a giant, continentspanning war of multiple families. This also involves a change at the level of
what might here be plausibly characterized as a minor or structurally inessential
quality: the number goes up from five families in the books to six in the game.
When we consider the significance of these developments in light of
previous findings, we see that the network-branch represented by the board game
no longer provides a direct mediation of the Wars of the Roses. Certain qualities
of the Wars, along with their attendant tensions and dramas, are no longer part of
the game’s allure for players. Rather, what allures players about the game is the
manner in which it channels, amplifies and modifies the larger-scale conflicts of
the books. This is the nature of its mediational allure.
When compared to the other branch off the network—and particularly to
the videogame—this alteration at the level of allure suggests something of
metaphysical significance about the nature of relatively open-ended gaming.
Here it should be acknowledged that the videogame is somewhat variable in its
outcomes as well, but only in the manner of the limited, choose-your-ownadventure type ethical options typical of numerous contemporary videogames.
All-in-all, its narrative sequence is highly deterministic, and there are only a few
major choices and outcomes.
Although its winner-takes-all rule-code means that the board game can only
have six final outcomes, it has a much larger and open-ended set of overall
possibilities for player decisions, strategies and sequences of play. Given the
relationship of these differing play possibilities to their differing eidetic
contents—with the videogame sticking to a persistent structural feature of the
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Wars eidos and the board game moving beyond it—this would seem to suggest
that relatively open-ended gaming tends to be productive of profound structural
changes in the nature of causal networks and what they mediate. Here I will
suggest that this is another feature of the current analysis that may have broader
implications. Perhaps the shift from stable eidetic transfers to the production of
radically new or different types of beings involves something like a shift from
predetermined gamic sequences to relatively open-ended types of games.

Conclusion
Altogether, then, the results of our current analysis include prospective methods
for locating the metaphysical means by which mediation occurs, for identifying
the discrete ontological units and subcomponents that comprise a mediating
object, and for describing the manner in which these components carry out their
inflections of content. As we have seen, they also suggest provisional means for
identifying certain of the invariable qualities of a mediated object, while still
respecting the phenomenological caution that Harman extends to the ultimately
concealed nature of things and their essences. In each of these ways, this analysis
has implications that go beyond the immediate empirical content. With its
emphasis on filtering, biases and the imposition of intentions and agendas, it is
relevant to the metaphysics of human media in general, and may also have
bearing on nonhuman forms of mediation.
As we saw in the previous section, the current implications also emit
interesting suggestions concerning the nature and underlying dynamics of causal
mediation. When one object mediates the causal force of another object to a third,
exerting mediational allure, it does so as a discrete unit folded into the larger
relation comprised by this very act, of which its causal patient or audience is also
a part. Mediators are therefore subcomponents of the mediations in which they
engage, and these mediations can themselves be modeled as substances, objects,
or units. Although the history of cumulative impacts that conditions a
mediational network or unit is an undeniably salient contributor to its relationallyrealized form, this history does not encompass or account for the full mediational
capacity of its various nodes, whose formal uniqueness and efficacy enables direct
or non-networked mediations of prior content.
When it comes to the question of how radical changes in formal structures
can be enacted in mediated causal networks, flexible or open-ended game systems
seem to provide a promising avenue for preliminary speculative modeling. In this
sense, our titular reference to a “Game of Objects” is more than simply a tip-ofthe-hat to the empirical contents of this paper. For what we have ultimately
learned from Game of Thrones is that creative shifts from one sort or game to
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another may be an important source of newness in the world. The many objects
comprising the GoT product-nexus are only one example in this regard. From a
metaphysical perspective, the Game of Objects is much larger than the Game of
Thrones. There may be no way to win or lose it in an absolute sense, but when it
comes to beings, the options are nonetheless binary: you’re either a player, or you
are not.
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